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Abstract
Despite numerous attempts to defend deep learning based image classifiers, they
remain susceptible to the adversarial attacks. This paper proposes a technique
to identify susceptible classes, those classes that are more easily subverted. To
identify the susceptible classes we use distance-based measures and apply them
on a trained model. Based on the distance among original classes, we create
mapping among original classes and adversarial classes that helps to reduce the
randomness of a model to a significant amount in an adversarial setting. We analyze
the high dimensional geometry among the feature classes and identify the k most
susceptible target classes in an adversarial attack. We conduct experiments using
MNIST, Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-10 (ImageNet and ResNet-32) datasets. Finally,
we evaluate our techniques in order to determine which distance based measure
works best and how the randomness of a model changes with perturbation.
1 Introduction
Protecting against adversarial attacks has become an important concern for machine learning (ML)
models since an adversary can cause a model to misclassify an input with high confidence by adding
small perturbation [10]. A number of prior works [25, 5, 33, 22, 34, 30, 31, 11, 4, 28, 27] have tried
to understand the characteristics of adversarial attacks. This work focuses on adversarial attacks on
deep neural networks (DNN) based image classifiers.
Our Contributions. Our work is driven by the two fundamental questions. Can an adversary fool
all classes equally well? If not, which classes are susceptible to adversarial attacks more so than
others? Identifying such classes can be important for developing better defense mechanisms. We
introduce a technique for identifying the top k susceptible classes. Our technique analyzes the DNN
model to understand the high dimensional geometry in the feature space. We have used four different
distance-based measures (t-SNE, N-D Euclidean, N-D Euclidean Cosine, and Nearest Neighbor
Hopping distance) for understanding the feature space. To determine the top k susceptible classes,
we create an adversarial map, which requires the distance in feature space among classes as input and
outputs a mapping of probable adversarial classes for each actual class. To create adversarial map, we
introduce the concept of the forbidden distance i.e., the distance measured in high dimension which
describes the capability of a model to defend an adversarial attack.
We conduct experiments on FGSM attack using MNIST [19], Fashion MNIST [32], and CIFAR-10
[17] (ImageNet [18] and ResNet-32 [12]) datasets to evaluate our technique. Finally, we compare
our results with cross-entropy (CE)[8] and reverse cross-entropy (RCE)[4] based training techniques
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that defend against adversarial attack. Our evaluation suggests that in comparison to the previous
state-of-the-art training based techniques, our proposed approach performs better and does not require
additional computational resources.
Next, we describe related works. §3 describes our methodology, §4 describes detailed results with the
experimental setup, and §5 concludes.
2 Related Work
The work on adversarial frameworks [9] can be categorized into attack and defense related studies.
Attack-related studies. Several studies have crafted attacks on ML models, e.g. FGSM [10],
CW [2], JSMA [25], Graph-based attack [35], attack on stochastic bandit algorithms [16], black-box
attacks [20, 24], etc. [3] studies transferability of attacks, and [1] surveys the kinds of attack using
synthesizing robust adversarial examples for any classifier.
Defense techniques (our work fits here). These works are primarily focused on improving ro-
bustness [33, 22, 34], detecting adversarial samples [30, 34], image manipulation [31, 11], attack
bounds [4, 28], distillation [27], geometric understanding [25], etc. There are other studies on the
geometrical understanding of adversarial attack [25, 5, 29]. Papernot et al.’s [25] work is closely
related to ours, where the authors built a capability-based adversarial saliency map between benign
class and adversarial class to craft perturbation in the input. In contrast, we utilize distance-based
measures to understand a DNN model and detect k-susceptible target classes. [5] utilizes the decision
boundary to understand the model and the authors have observed a relationship between the decision
boundary and the Gaussian noise added to the input. [6] has conducted a similar study to understand
how decision boundary learned by a model helps to understand high dimensional data and proposed
the bound over the error of a model. Our approach finds the relation of high dimensional geometry
with adversarial attacks and identifies k susceptible classes.
3 Our Approach: Identifying Susceptible Classes
We use distances (§3.3) to create adversarial map (§3.4) and use it to pick susceptible classes (§3.5).
3.1 Terminology
This study concentrates on the feed-forward DNN classifiers. A DNN can be represented as a function
f(X, p) : RN → Rn, where p is the set of tunable parameters, X is the input, n is the number of
labeled classes and N is the number of features and X ∈ RN . In this study, the feature space for a
model has been represented using RN . The focus of the paper is to understand the high dimensional
geometry to identify susceptible target classes for a model. We calculate distance d(ci, cj) between
two classes ci and cj , where i 6= j. We utilize four different distance-based measures and compare
them. In adversarial setting, f(X, p)→ f(X + η, p), where η is the perturbation added to the input
which causes, f(X, p) 6= f(X + η, p). Our assumption in this study is that f(X + η, p) depends on
the d(ci, cj) of a model. To compare different distances, we calculate the randomness in a model
using the entropy. We define the entropy of a model M as eM where,
eM = −ΣP (xi) log(P (xi)) (1)
P (xi) denotes the probability of input xi, which has been misclassified to class cj given the actual
label ci. In this study, we use terms e.g., actual class and adversarial class, which represents the
label of a data point predicted by a model and the label after a model has gone through an attack
respectively. We introduce a term forbidden distance as D, a measured distance which provides
the upper bound of displacement of data points in RN . In this context, displacement represents the
distance between the adversarial class and the actual class. In this study, we have conducted our
experiment using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10]. Here, we have chosen single attack
based on the Adversarial transferable property [25, 26], which defines that adversarial examples
created for one model are highly probable to be misclassified by a different model.
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3.2 Hypothesis (H0)
According to linearity hypothesis proposed in [10], there is still a significant amount of linearity
present in a model even though a DNN model utilizes non-linear transformation. The primary reason
behind this is the usage of LSTM [13], ReLu [15, 7], etc, which possess a significant amount of
linear components to optimize the complexity. Here, we assume that the input examples can be
misclassified to neighboring classes in the RN during adversarial attack.
3.3 Distance Calculation
Calculation of t-SNE distance To understand RN representation, we utilize t-SNE [21] dimension
reduction technique. t-SNE uses the Euclidean distance of data points in N dimension as input and
converts it into the probability of similarity, pj|i =
exp(−||xi−xj||2/2σ2i )
Σi6=j exp(−||xi−xj||2/2σ2i ) where, pj|i represents
the probability of similarity between two input data points i and j in RN . We calculate the distance
d(ci, cj) based on the pj|i. We convert N -dimensional problem to a 2-dimensional problem. In this
process, we do not consider the error due to the curse of dimensionality [14]. In 2-D feature space,
we have the co-ordinate xi(~x, ~y) for a data point xi and we calculate the center of mass cmi, where i
is the class. Here, mass of each point xi, is assumed to be unit, then center of mass cmi represents,
cmi =
cix1+cix2+...+cixn
|ci| , where, cixj represents the xj data point of class ci.
Calculation of N-D Euclidean Distance Furthermore, we calculate the N -dimensional Euclidean
distance between two data points. Each data point can be represented by a feature vector ~F =
{ci ~xj(1), ci ~xj(2), ..., ci ~xj(N)}, where ci ~xj(k) is the kth vector component of data point xj of class
ci. Here, ci ~xj(k) has been represented as a coordinate in RN . We calculate the center of mass similar
to the t-SNE based approach. The main difference is the calculated center of mass cmi is a vector of
N coordinates. Thus, ∀i 6= j, distance d(ci, cj) can be calculated as,
d(ci, cj) =
√
(cmj(1)− cmi(1))2 + ...+ (cmj(N)− cmi(N))2) (2)
Calculation of N-D Euclidean Cosine Distance We use the N dimensional angular distance as
our next measure. In this process, we calculate the N -dimensional Euclidean distance similar to
the prior technique. In N -dimension, the angular similarity among the center of mass of classes
cmi, cmj can be calculated as, θcmi,cmj =
~cmi. ~cmj
|| ~cmi|.|| ~cmj || , where || ~cmj || is the magnitude of the
cmj vector. We leverage the angular similarity and calculate the N -dimensional Euclidean angular
distance between center of mass of two classes using the following equation,
d(ci, cj) =
√
(cmj(1)− cmi(1))2 + ...+ ((cmj(n)− cmi(n))2) ∗ cos
(
~cmi. ~cmj
|| ~cmi|.|| ~cmj ||
)
(3)
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Algorithm 1 Hopping Distance
1: procedure HOPDISTANCE (Xi, Xj )
2: Vchild = { Neighbor of Xi}
3: distance = 0;
4: Mark Xi visited; Vlist = NULL
5: if (Xi 6= Xj) then
6: while Xj /∈ Vlist do
7: distance=distance+1
8: Vexpand = NULL
9: for each v ∈ Vchild do
10: if (v not visited) then
11: vx = {Neighbor of v}
12: Vexpand = Vexpand ∪ vx
13: Mark v visited
14: end if
15: end for
16: Vlist = Vlist ∪ Vexpand
17: Vchild = Vexpand
18: end while
19: end if
20: return distance
21: end procedure
Calculation of Nearest Neighbor Hopping Distance Here, we use the nearest neighbor algorithm
to understand the behavior of an adversarial attack. For distance calculation, we develop an algorithm
which computes the hopping distance 1 between two classes. Initially, we calculate k nearest
neighbors for each data point. Due to Reflexive property, a data point is inevitably neighbor to itself,
which approves (k − 1) different neighbors for a data point. The boundary learned by the nearest
neighbor algorithm distinguishes classes by dividing into clusters. Then, nearest neighbors will
belong to the same class for most of the data points except the data points located near the boundary.
We leverage that information and compute the classes nearest to a particular class.
Example 3.1. Let us assume the points in class c1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, c2 = {y1, y2, y3, y4}, c3 =
{z1, z2, z3, z4}. For example, we find the closest point of x1 outside c1 is z1, of x2 is y1, of x3 is y2,
x4 is y3. As depicted in Figure 1(b), we observe that 34 of the data points in c1 have their closest
neighbors in c2. So, we can say that c2 shares more boundary with c1 and is the closest neighboring
class to c1.
Hopping Distance computes how many hops a data point needs to travel to reach the closest data
point in the target class. From the nearest neighbor algorithm, we get the (k − 1) unique neighbors
to each data point. Algorithm 1 takes the output from the k nearest neighbor, the actual predicted
data point and the misclassified label as input. This problem has been converted to a problem of
tree generation from lines 2 - 4 . From lines 5 - 21, we expand the tree when a new neighbor has
been found and traverse using BFS. Finally, we calculate the depth of the expanded tree to calculate
the minimum distance that a data point has to travel to reach the misclassified class in RN . This
algorithm utilizes the same time and space complexity as BFS does, which is O(V ) for time and
O(V ) for space, as in the worst case, we need to traverse all the neighbors (|V |) for an actual class.
We also calculate the forbidden distance based on the average hopping distance (D) for a model. In
the Eq.4, n and |X| denote the total number of classes and data points respectively. We use Eq.4 for
both calculating the forbidden distance (Fd) and also the average displacement of data points in RN
under an attack. For calculating the later, xi is the actual class and xj is the adversarial class. In order
to create the adversarial map, we compute a matrix storing the distance among all classes (SD) using
Eq. 5, where xk is the total number of data points in class ck.
D =
Σ∀(xi∈ck,xj∈cl,k,n∈{1,2,...,n},i6=j)HopDistance(xi, xj)
|X| (4)
SD =
⋃
l,k∈1,2,...,n
Σ∀(xi∈ck,xj∈cl,k,n∈{1,2,...,n},i6=j)HopDistance(xi, xj)
|xk| (5)
4
c1
c3
c2
d
d
d
d d d
c1
c3
c2
d1
d4
d3
d2
(a)
x1 x2
x3
x4
y4
y1 y2 y3
z1
z2
z3
z4
c1
c2
c3
(b)
Figure 1: (a) Creation of Adversarial Map. (b) Class c1 shares more boundary with c2 than c3 as 34 of the data
points in c1 have their closest neighbors in c2.
Lemma 3.1. ∀x ∈ ci,∀y ∈ cj ,∀z ∈ ck if average hopping distance d(ci, cj) < d(ci, ck), then cj is
closer to ci than ck to ci i.e., the distance of center of mass d(cmi, cmj) < d(cmi, cmk).
Proof.
∑
l,m d(xl,ym)
|ci∗cj | <
∑
l,n d(xl,zn)
|ci∗ck| . Without the loss of generality, we can say that,∑
l,m d(xl, ym) <
∑
l,n d(xl, zn). As center of mass will always be within the polygon surrounding
a class, without loss of generality we assume all the ym are at the same location p and all the zn are
at the same location q. ∑
l,m
d(xl, ym) <
∑
l,n
d(xl, zn)
=⇒ |x1 − p|+ |x2 − p|+ ...+ |xl − p||ci ∗ cj | <
|x1 − q|+ |x2 − q|+ ...+ |xl − q|
|ci ∗ ck|
=⇒ cmi|cj | −
cmj
|ci| <
cmi
|ck| −
cmk
|ci|
Assuming the balanced dataset, |ci| ∼ |cj | ∼ ck, =⇒ cmi − cmj < cmi − cmk So, the center of
mass of cj is closer to ci than the center of mass of ck to ci.
Lemma 3.2. In RN , if a class ci has been misclassified to a closer class cj , the entropy eM will
decrease.
Proof. The entropy eM = −ΣP (xi) log(P (xi)). With the increase of P (xi), log(P (xi)) also
increases. So, we can say that eM ∝ −P (xi) =⇒ eM ∝ 1P (xi) . From H0 (§3.2), we assume that
if a class ci is close to class cj , we allocate a higher probability to P (xi). So, if classes are mostly
misclassified to the closer one, the entropy of the entire model will decrease.
3.4 Adversarial Map
Definition 3.1. Forbidden distance (Fd): When a model encounters an adversarial attack, each
input class requires to travel a certain distance in RN to accomplish the attack. Based on the attack
type, maximum distance changes. We call this forbidden distance (Fd) as beyond this distance
adversarial attack will not be successful. For example, to accomplish the adversarial attack given a
forbidden distance of a model Fd and to misclassify c1 as c2, distance constraint between c1 and c2
is d(c1, c2) ≤ Fd.
In this section, we describe how we create the adversarial map annotated with distance to neighbors.
Here, we utilize the forbidden distance while creating the adversarial map. Hypothetically, any class
c1 as shown in Figure 1(a) can be misclassified to any other class by traveling the same distance
d. But our hypothesis is that every attack has a limitation. A data point in ci might need to travel
different distance for misclassifying to different classes ck, where k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, i 6= k. If we
represent the distance between ci and ck as d(ci, ck) then the attack can be accomplished more
easily where d(ci, ck) is minimum. argmin(d(cs, ct)) =⇒ MP (cs → ct) In the above equation if
d(cs, ct) is minimum then the attack can missclassify cs as ct represented by the function MP . We
create this adversarial map by using the distance between classes ci and cj as described in §3.3. Then
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we introduce the notion of forbidden distance Fd. We claim that the attack on a certain class cs can
misclassify as class ct if and only if d(cs, ct) ≤ Fd as mentioned in the following equation:
cs → ct ⇐⇒ d(cs, ct) ≤ Fd (6)
Now, we create the adversarial map from the distance between different classes as depicted in
Algorithm 2, which takes the distance between different classes (SD) as input. Then, different edges
are added to the graph G mentioned in lines 3 - 7. Finally, the adversarial map is returned in line 7.
This algorithm runs in O(|SD|2) time and O(n) space complexity.
Lemma 3.3. The attack can misclassify a class ci only to one of its neighbors cj in adversarial map.
Proof. Let us assume an attack has a prior knowledge of a model, training example of class ci and
can misclassify to ck which is not a neighbor. We know an attack can only misclassify ci as ck if
and only if d(ci, ck) ≤ Fd. According to Algorithm 2 if d(ci, ck) ≤ Fd then, ck is the neighbor of
ci. This leads to a contradiction. So the attack can only misclassify ci as one of its neighboring
classes.
3.5 Susceptible Class Identification
Algorithm 2 Create Adversarial Map
1: procedure CREATEMAP (SD)
2: G← empty graph
3: for each U, V ∈ SD do
4: if (d(U, V ) ≤ Fd) then
5: G← G ∪ edge(U, V, d(U, V ))
6: end if
7: end for
return G
8: end procedure
Here, we use the best among four distance-
based measures and identify k susceptible target
classes for a model. In an adversarial setting,
we find the target classes which are most likely
being misclassified from the actual class. Our
primary hypothesis (H0) claims that any class
will be misclassified to the nearest class under
an attack. In order to identify k susceptible
classes, we use our mapping between the actual
class and adversarial class mentioned in §3.4.
For a particular class ci, we assign weighted
probability to all misclassified classes cj , where
j ∈ 1, 2, ..., n, i 6= j based on the distance com-
puted using the best distance-based measure. Higher the distance between two classes, lower the
probability of one class being misclassified as another. We perform a cumulative operation on
individual probability of being misclassified given the actual input label for n. The top k classes with
highest probability will be identified as the susceptible classes under an adversarial attack.
Lemma 3.4. Cumulative of the individual probability of adversarial classes given the actual classes
determines the most susceptible classes of a model.
Proof. For a DNN model M , the data sets are categorized into n classes. For each class ci, there
is a list of at most (n − 1) classes which can be close to ci. For each class, we determine them
based on the hypothesis H0. The probability of a class ci being misclassified as cj can be determined
based on the adversarial map. Lesser the distance between cj and ci, higher the probability of ci
being misclassifed as cj . So, P (cj |ci) ∝ 1d(ci,cj) . Here, P (cj |ci) denotes the probability of ci being
misclassifed as cj . As, c1, c2, ..., cn are all independent events, the total probability of an adversarial
class cj is P (cj) = P (cj |ci) + ... + P (cn|cj) and as if class ci has been misclassified as ci, we
do not consider that as an adversarial effect. Hence, P (ci|ci) = 0. Without the loss of generality,
P (cj) = Σi∈{1,2,...,n},i6=jP (cj |ci). So, the probability of an adversarial class is the cumulative of
individual probability of that class given all the actual classes.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Setup
In this study, we have used MNIST [19], Fashion MNIST (F-MNIST) [32] and CIFAR-10 [17]
datasets. The number of labeled classes is 10 for each dataset. MNIST and F-MNIST contains 60,000
training images and 10,000 test images. Both train and test dataset are equally partitioned into 10
classes. Each class has 6,000 training and 1,000 test images. CIFAR-10 contains 50,000 training
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Figure 2: The forbidden distance for a model and average hopping distance varying with perturbation . (a)
MNIST, (b) F-MNIST, (c) CIFAR10-ResNet32, and (d) CIFAR10-ImageNet
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Figure 3: Entropy varying with perturbation  for a model prior applying our techniques and after applying each
technique. (a) MNIST, (b) F-MNIST, (c) CIFAR10-ResNet32, and (d) CIFAR10-ImageNet
images and 10,000 test images. We have worked on one model each for MNIST and F-MNIST with
accuracy 98% and 89% respectively whereas, for CIFAR-10, we have performed our experiment on
two models, Simplified ImageNet [18] and ResNet-32 [12] with accuracy 72% and 82% respectively.
For crafting FGSM attack, we have utilized the Cleverhans[23] library. We have experimented using
four distance-based measures on each dataset with the label of each data point predicted by the
model. We have run our susceptible class detection on the entire dataset with FGSM attack for each
model and determine k-susceptible target classes. For all experiment with variable perturbation, with
change the  = 0.01 for each simulation and run the similation from  = 0.01 to  = 2.0. Hence, 20
simulations have been executed for each experiment.
4.2 Usability of adversarial map for susceptible class detection
We have claimed that using the adversarial map we can identify the susceptible classes. We will
discuss the accuracy of the best distance-based measure in §4.4. We have evaluated our approach
on four separate models. In §4.1, we have briefly described each model. For MNIST and F-MNIST,
we have utilized a simple model with one input, one dense and one output layer. We have used
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Figure 4: Accuracy varying with perturbation  using (a) MNIST, (b) F-MNIST, (c) CIFAR10-ResNet32, and (d)
CIFAR10-ImageNet .
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state-of-the-art models for CIFAR-10 to evaluate our techniques. To calculate the distance, we have
implemented four different measures and compared among them by computing the entropy of the
model. Initially, we have calculated the entropy of a model, by applying an adversarial attack with
a fixed perturbation. In the equation, eM = −ΣP (xi) logP (xi), we assume that without any prior
information, the probability of an input misclassified as an adversarial class given the actual class
is 1n−1 . For a fixed model, the value of P (xi) is constant for all data points based on the previous
assumption. However, we have leveraged adversarial map to provide weighted probability to each
adversarial class based on the calculated distance between them. We have calculated the entropy
based on the weighted probability using calculated distance from the actual class e.g., for actual class
xi has neighbors xj and xk. Here, xj is closer to xi. In this scenario, P (xj |xi) > P (xk|xi). Our
goal is to reduce the entropy in a model with the distance-based measures. In Figure 3, we evaluate
the change of randomness by computing the entropy for all four models with four distance-based
measures and compare them. In all the cases, Nearest Neighbor Hopping distance based measure
performs best in decreasing the entropy of a model under an adversarial setting. We have found
that with increasing perturbation, the randomness typically increases. In contrast, the entropy in
all the cases becomes more or less constant after a certain amount of perturbation. This indicates
that, mostly all images are misclassified after certain perturbation and thus the entropy will not
change in relation to the perturbation. Surprisingly, we have found that for CIFAR-10 ImageNet and
ResNet-32 model, the entropy decreases with increasing perturbation. In Figure 3(c) and (d), initially
the entropy increases with increasing perturbation but decreases with increasing perturbation after a
certain simulation. We found that data points that have been misclassified with lower perturbation,
were classified correctly with higher perturbation. In Figure 5, initially the image has been classified
correctly as frog by the ImageNet model. With perturbation  = 0.1, the image has been misclassified
as deer. Whereas, with perturbation  = 0.2, the image has been classified correctly.
4.3 Effect of forbidden distance on adversarial attack
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: (a) Actual image data from CIFAR-
10, (b) Image with  = 0.1, (c) Image with
 = 0.2.
In this section, we have shown that the forbidden distance
for different attacks and models. Moreover, we have evalu-
ated the effectiveness of FD in misclassification. We have
claimed that the attack can not travel more than FD under
a particular adversarial setting. We have proved our claim
by computing FD on actual training data and demonstrate
that the average hopping distance (D) traveled under an
attack which remains less than FD. After calculating D
using the Eq.4, we have simulated D with increasing per-
turbation for each model. We have assumed that with
increasing perturbation, the force of the attack increases so as the average distance (displacement)
traveled by data points in RN . This is similar to the simple harmonic motion law of physics, which
states that the displacement is proportional to the force. We have also evaluated the forbidden distance
for each model and found whether the assumption regarding D and FD applies. In Figure 2, we have
simulated four cases and found that D increases with perturbation and it remains under the bound
given by FD. Hence, FD provides an upper-bound distance for a model. But, in our approach, we
have defined it as the capacity of withstanding an attack for a particular model.
Table 1: Comparison of accuracy(%) with learning based detection algorithms RCE[4] and CE[8] with NN(our
approach). Accuracy
Method MNIST F-MNIST CIFAR-10ResNet
CIFAR-10
ImageNet
CE 79.7 - 71.5 -
RCE 98.8 - 92.6 -
NN 55.3 64.8 99.9 94.4
Using our approach, if the hopping distance between the classes ci and cj is more than FD, then ci
can not be misclassified to cj . We have compared the model’s FD withD after a model has undergone
through an attack. We have found that prior knowledge of a model provides a good estimation for
describing the behavior of the adversarial examples.
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4.4 Effect of adversarial map and susceptible class identifier
In this section, we take advantage of our adversarial map and susceptible class identifier to analyze
the threats to a DNN model. We have utilized the adversarial map and computed the top k susceptible
target classes as described in the §3.5. In Figure 4, we have simulated our approach varying
perturbation and k. Though, it is apparent that with a larger value of k, the accuracy of predicting
susceptible target classes will increase. We want to increase the accuracy of our approach with least
value of k. This is a trade-off situation between k and accuracy. From Figure 4, we have found that
our approach performs best with k = 4 for all models used in the evaluation. We have compared
our work in Table 1 with reverse cross-entropy (RCE) [4] and common cross-entropy (CE)[8]. Our
approach can identify the susceptible target class with higher accuracy using CIFAR-10 with ResNet-
32 and ImageNet respectively. Whereas, the accuracy for DNN model using MNIST is lower than
the previous work. To understand the reason, we have examined the adversarial classes for models
using MNIST. We have found that model using MNIST has different adversarial map for each actual
class and all most all adversarial classes are susceptible to be attacked. To check further, we have
visualized MNIST based model using t-SNE in 2-D space and have observed that the visualization
shows a distinct separation among classes. Whereas, the 2-D visualization of the CIFAR-10 dataset
based DNN model depicts some overlaps among the features, and our distance-based approach has
discovered a certain pattern in the adversarial map. Thus, we can conclude that our approach works
better for models with high complexity e.g., CIFAR-10 based DNN models.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a technique to detect susceptible classes using the prior information
of a model. First, we analyze a DNN model to compute the distance among classes in feature space.
Then, we utilize that information to identify k classes that are susceptible to be attacked. We found
that with k = 4, our approach performs best. To compare the four distance-based measures, we have
presented a technique to create adversarial map to identify susceptible classes. We have evaluated
the utility of four different measures in creating adversarial map. We have also introduced the idea
of forbidden distance Fd in the construction of adversarial map. We have experimentally evaluated
that the adversary can not misclassify to a target beyond distance Fd. We have found that Nearest
Neighbor hopping is able to describe the adversarial behavior by decreasing the entropy of a model
and computing the upper bound distance (FD) accurately. Our approach is also able to detect k
susceptible target classes that can detect adversarial examples with high accuracy for CIFAR-10
dataset (ImageNet and ResNet-32). In addition, for MNIST and F-MNIST, our approach possesses
an accuracy of 55.3% and 64.3% respectively. Currently, our susceptible class detection identifies
the source class of an adversarial example with probability. In the future, we want to find and study
more properties of adversarial attack to detect adversarial examples with a lower bound guarantee.
Analyzing model analysis techniques and algorithms to achieve the goal remain future work.
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